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The Minimum Wage and Latino Workers 
 
Introduction 
The federal minimum wage rose to $5.85 from $5.15 in July 2007, the first increase in 
the federal wage floor in a decade.  The federal minimum wage will rise in two additional 70-
cent increments over the next two years, reaching $7.25 an hour in July 2009.  The increase to 
$7.25 from $5.15 over a two-year period will marks the first rise in the federal wage floor since 
1997 and is, in non-inflation adjusted terms, the largest absolute increase in the minimum wage 
since its inception in 1938.  This increase makes it important to understand how the minimum 
wage affects earnings and employment among low-skilled, low-wage workers.  Assessing the 
impact of minimum wages on Latinos is particularly important given that they are now the 
largest minority group in the U.S. and tend to have relatively low levels of education.  This study 
therefore examines how minimum wage laws affected Latino workers’ employment and 
earnings, compared with non-Latinos, during the period 1994-2005. 
Previous research suggests that minimum wages may have sizable effects among Latino 
teenagers and young adults.  Neumark and Wascher (2007) indicate that higher minimum wages 
are associated with lower employment rates among Hispanics aged 16-24 years old, with the 
adverse employment effect increasing over time.  Indeed, their results suggest that young 
Hispanics are more adversely affected than other racial and ethnic groups.  Several studies also 
suggest that higher minimum wages are associated with more “idleness,” or being neither 
enrolled in school nor working, among Hispanic and black teenagers (Neumark and Wascher, 
1996; Turner and Demiralp, 2001).   2
Latinos may be particularly affected by minimum wage laws because of relatively low 
average education levels and high rates of limited English proficiency.
1  As of 2005, almost 42 
percent of Hispanics—and 54 percent of foreign-born Hispanics—aged 25 and older in the U.S. 
did not have a high school diploma or equivalent.  Less than 10 percent of non-Hispanic whites 
and 19 percent of blacks, in contrast, had not completed high school.
2  Data from the 2000 
Census indicate that almost 82 percent of Hispanics aged 18-64 years old speak a language other 
than English at home, and almost 28 percent report that they speak English either “not well” or 
“not at all.”
3 
  This study assesses the incidence and impact of minimum wages on Latinos.  We focus 
on Latino teenagers and low-education Latino adults because these age/education groups are 
most likely to be affected by minimum wage laws.  Although a few previous studies have 
examined the effect of minimum wages among Hispanics, most reported results that combined 
Hispanics with blacks and none distinguished between Latino natives and immigrants, which we 
do.  Our examination of the effect of minimum wages on Latinos begins with an explanation of 
how minimum wages fit into a simple supply and demand model.  We then discuss the data, 
which are from the Current Population Survey during 1994-2005, and our empirical methods.  
The results indicate that the disemployment effect of higher minimum wages is smaller among 
foreign- than native-born Latino teenagers and is nonexistent for non-Hispanic white teens.  
Among low-educated adults, minimum wages only adversely affect the employment rates of 
blacks.  In fact, we find a positive employment effect for low-education foreign-born Latino 
                                                 
1 Most U.S. data sets including the ones we use here ask individuals whether they are Hispanic, not Latino.  We 
therefore treat the two as equivalent here.  Individuals of Spanish ancestry might identify themselves as Hispanic but 
usually would not be considered Latinos, while individuals of Brazilian ancestry might not identify themselves as 
Hispanic but usually would be considered Latinos. 
2 Authors’ calculations based on education statistics from Bureau of the Census data available at 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/education/cps2005.html [accessed March 1, 2007]. 
3 Authors’ calculations based on summary tables from the Census 2000 Summary File (SF 3).   3
adults.  We investigate whether substitution across skill groups and undocumented status among 
immigrant Latinos underlie these results. 
 
Model 
Conventional economic theory predicts that minimum wages raise hourly earnings and 
lower employment.  A simple version of this model is shown in Figure 1.  In the absence of a 
minimum wage, the labor market clears at the market wage, the wage at which the labor supply 
and labor demand curves intersect.  In the figure, the number of workers employed at the market 
wage is labeled Qm.  Imposing a “binding” minimum wage—one higher than the market clearing 
wage—reduces the number of workers hired to the quantity labeled Qd but increases the number 
of individuals who are willing to work to the quantity Qs.  The decline in the number of people 
employed is given by the quantity Qm – Qd.  The quantity Qs – Qd represents the number of 
people unemployed.  Further increases in the minimum wage would lower the number of 
workers employed while raising the number of people who are unemployed.  Economists usually 
focus on measuring the employment effect instead of unemployment since a higher minimum 
wage will cause people to enter the labor market, and not all of those people will find jobs.  The 
policy implications of this minimum wage-induced increase in unemployment are not clear.  
Moreover, unemployment statistics are misleading in that some people who cannot find a job 
stop searching and then are not counted as unemployed in official statistics. 
The negative employment effect should be largest among workers who tend to earn low 
wages, such as teenagers, young adults, and workers at fast food restaurants.  A number of 
studies have therefore focused on estimating the effect of minimum wage increases on 
employment among these groups.  These studies typically find that a 10 percent increase in the   4
minimum wage leads to a 1-3 percent decline in employment.
4  However, some research 
suggests that higher minimum wages are not necessarily associated with lower employment rates 
even though they raise workers’ average hourly earnings (e.g., Card 1992a, 1992b; Card, Katz, 
and Krueger, 1994; Card and Krueger, 1994; Katz and Krueger, 1992).  One potential 
explanation for these results, which are counter to the conventional model, is that employers 
substitute more-skilled workers for less-skilled workers as the minimum wage increases, 
resulting in no net change in aggregate employment but changes across groups.
5  If Latinos are 
viewed as less skilled than non-Hispanic whites, employers might substitute non-Hispanic whites 
for Latinos.  Another possibility is that employment rates based on surveys of individuals remain 
unchanged despite minimum wage increases because some individuals work “under the table” 
for wages below the legal minimum.
6 
From a theoretical standpoint, the impact of minimum wages is likely to be larger among 
Latinos than among non-Hispanic whites.  As discussed above, Latinos, particularly those who 
are foreign-born, tend to have less education than non-Hispanic whites.  If firms reduce 
employment of low-skilled workers when the minimum wage increases, Latinos should be more 
affected than other groups.  Foreign-born Latinos should be particularly adversely affected since 
they are likely to have less U.S. work experience than natives as well as limited English skills.  
On the other hand, immigrants—especially undocumented immigrants—may be more likely than 
natives to work “off the books” and therefore not be adversely affected by changes in labor laws 
                                                 
4 For a recent survey, see Neumark and Wascher (2006). 
5 For formal models of the effects across skill levels of minimum wage increases, see, for example, Connolly (2003) 
and Lang and Kahn (1998). 
6 Another potential explanation is imperfectly competitive labor markets (monopsony).  For an overview, see 
Zavodny (1998).   5
like the minimum wage.
7  In addition, the measured employment effect of higher minimum 
wages might be closer to zero among immigrants because some immigrants who lose their jobs 
and cannot find work when the minimum wage increases will leave the U.S. (or move within the 
U.S.).  Immigrants who are not naturalized U.S. citizens, and especially those illegally present in 
the U.S., have relatively little access to the public safety net—welfare benefits, unemployment 
insurance benefits, etc.—and therefore may return to their home country if they cannot earn 




  We use individual-level data to examine how minimum wage laws affect hourly earnings 
and employment during the period 1994 to 2005.  The data are from the Current Population 
Survey, a large-scale survey conducted monthly among a representative random sample of 
households in the U.S.  About 50,000 households per month participate in the survey and answer 
questions about household composition and demographic characteristics.  Housing units are in 
the sample for four months, out for eight months, and then back in the sample for four months.  
When a housing unit is in the fourth and eight survey waves (the outgoing rotation), the survey 
asks about individuals’ employment status and earnings.  Our data consist of individuals who are 
in these outgoing rotation groups and who reported information about their demographic 
characteristics and labor force outcomes. 
  We constructed two samples from the outgoing rotation groups: teenagers and low-
education adults.  Teenagers are aged 16-19, and low-education adults are aged 20-54 and do not 
                                                 
7 Mehta et al. (2002) indicate that about 10 percent of undocumented immigrants (and 3 percent of documented 
immigrants) interviewed in the Chicago area in 2001 reported being paid less than the minimum wage.  About 90 
percent of the undocumented immigrants were from Latin America.   6
have a high school diploma or equivalent.  We focus on these groups since they tend to earn 
relatively low wages and hence are likely to be affected by minimum wage laws. 
  Our measure of the minimum wage is the higher of federal and state minimum wages (the 
“effective minimum wage”) in each state.  For simplicity and comparability to most previous 
studies, we do not examine federal and state “subminimum” wages (which allow employers to 
pay young or recently-hired workers a lower minimum wage); industry- or occupation-specific 
minimum wages (such as the tip credit minimum wage for some restaurant workers); city-level 
minimum wages (which occurred in a few areas toward the end of our sample period); or “living 
wage” requirements.
8  The federal minimum wage increased twice early in our sample period, 
from $4.25 to $4.75 in October 1996 and to $5.15 in September 1997.   Figure 2 shows the value 
of the real (inflation-adjusted) federal minimum wage during 1994-2005.  As inflation erodes the 
real value of the minimum wage, a number of states have opted to pass higher minimum wages.  
The number of states with a minimum wage above the federal level at some point during the year 
ranges from a low of 8 in 1998 to a high of 17 in 2005.  We use the effective minimum wage on 
the 12
th of the month and year in which individuals completed the survey (because the reference 
period for the labor force questions is the week including the 12
th).   
  Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for workers who earn exactly the minimum wage, 
workers who are paid less than the minimum wage, and workers who earn within 125 percent of 
the minimum wage.  The table also reports (in the last column) descriptive statistics for all 
                                                 
8 The tip credit specifies a lower minimum wage (currently $2.13 per hour) for employees who earn tips.  When tips 
are included, the tipped workers must earn at least the legal minimum wage (currently $5.15 at the federal level).  
We also do not control for changes in the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) or for welfare reform, which might 
affect the incentive to work among low-skilled workers.  The year fixed effects capture any national-level effects of 
changes in such factors.  See Neumark and Wascher (2007) for a study that combines the effects of minimum wages 
and the EITC among teens and young adults.   7
workers as a benchmark.
9  About one-third of all workers earning exactly the minimum wage are 
teenagers.  Teens account for a slightly lower, but still considerable, fraction of workers earning 
less than the minimum wage and slightly above the minimum wage.  About 26 percent, 16 
percent, and 20 percent of workers earning exactly, less than, and slightly above the minimum 
wage are Hispanic.  Since Hispanics only compose 14 percent of workers during our sample 
period, Hispanics are much more likely to be employed at low wages than other racial and ethnic 
groups.  The majority of these low-wage Latino workers are foreign-born, although over one-
third of low-wage Latino workers are U.S.-born.  Table 1 also indicates that women, along with 
individuals who have not completed high school, are also disproportionately employed in low-
wage jobs.
10 
  We examine four groups of teenagers and low-education adults: Latino immigrants, 
Latino natives, non-Hispanic whites, and non-Hispanic blacks.  All individuals who identify 
themselves as being of Hispanic origin or descent are considered Hispanic (Latino) in this 
analysis.  Latino immigrants are Hispanic individuals who were born in Latin America (Mexico, 
Central America, and South America), Cuba, or the Dominican Republic and who were not U.S. 
citizens at birth.  Latino natives are Hispanic individuals who report being born in the U.S. (not 
in an outlying area such as Puerto Rico) and who were U.S. citizens at birth.
11  In this analysis, 
non-Hispanic whites and blacks are individuals who identified themselves as white or black but 
did not identify themselves as Hispanic.  Hispanic individuals can therefore be of any race.  Our 
                                                 
9 The table, like all of the earnings analyses presented here, is based only on workers paid an hourly wage.  The 
results are qualitatively similar if workers paid at other frequencies are included, although the workers then tend to 
be older and have more education.  Unlike the other tables shown here, Table 1 includes all Latinos, regardless of 
place of birth.  The samples we use later on restrict native-born Latinos to Hispanics born in the U.S. (and not in 
outlying areas such a Puerto Rico) and foreign-born Latinos to Hispanics born in Latin America, Cuba, or the 
Dominican Republic. 
10 The share of workers who lack a high school degree or its equivalent is overstated in the table as some people may 
yet go on to complete such a degree in the future. 
11 People born in outlying areas (e.g., Puerto Rico and Guam) are U.S. citizens at birth.   8
samples do not include other non-Hispanic individuals, such as Asians, because sample sizes are 
relatively small for such groups.  Non-Hispanic whites and blacks are not divided into 
immigrants and natives because very few (less than 2 percent) are immigrants.
12 
  We analyze two labor market outcomes: average hourly earnings and employment.  
Individuals who are employed during the survey week report how much they earn per hour, 
week, or other time period.  Our earnings analysis focuses on individuals who are paid hourly in 
order to reduce measurement error.
13  The earnings analysis also only includes individuals who 
earn at least $1 per hour and at most $100 per hour, again in order to reduce measurement 
error.
14  Earnings and the minimum wage are corrected for inflation with the monthly consumer 
price index for urban wage earners (CPI-W). 
  Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for our samples.  Real average hourly earnings and 
employment are both considerably lower among teenagers than among adults who do not have a 
high school diploma.  Reflecting the fact that most immigrants arrive as young adults and not as 
children, only 5 percent of the teenage sample is foreign-born Latino compared with 33 percent 
of the low-education adult sample.  The proportions composed of native-born Latinos and non-
Hispanic blacks are similar for the two samples at about 10 and 15 percent, respectively. 
  As suggested by the age and education characteristics of low-wage workers, a large 
fraction of teenagers and low-education adults earn near the minimum wage.  Figures 3-6 show 
the distribution of hourly earnings relative to the minimum wage among teenagers and low-
education adults in our samples.  Figures 3 and 5 show the fraction of workers in each 
race/ethnicity group earning various percentiles of the minimum wage (measured in 25 percent 
                                                 
12 The small shares of immigrants among non-Hispanic whites and blacks is due to the fact that our sample is limited 
to adults who lack a high school degree and teens. 
13 For a discussion of measurement error in earnings variables in the CPS, see Lemieux (2006). 
14 This restriction drops 0.04 percent of the teenage sample and 0.07 percent of the low-education adult sample.   9
increments), and Figures 4 and 6 show the cumulative density function (the cumulative fraction 
of workers earning various percentiles of the minimum wage) for each group. 
  The distributions indicate several interesting patterns.  A large proportion of teens earn 
about 125 percent of the minimum wage, as indicated by the spike in the earnings distribution in 
Figure 3.  Very few teens earn more than 200 percent of the minimum wage, as shown in Figure 
4.  Overall, given how close together the lines are on figures 3 and 4, the data suggest there are 
few differences in the distribution of hourly earnings by race/ethnicity/nativity among teens.  
Among low-education adults, in contrast, there are more differences across these groups (Figures 
5 and 6).  Latino immigrants and non-Hispanic blacks have the lowest earnings, followed by 
Latino natives.  The earnings distribution is less centered on the minimum wage among low-
education adults than among teenagers, suggesting that the minimum wage plays a larger role in 
teens’ labor force outcomes. 
 
Methods 
We estimate two main regression models, one for hourly earnings and one for 
employment.  The covariate of interest in both models is the minimum wage.  We expect to see a 
positive relationship between the minimum wage and hourly earnings and a negative relationship 
between the minimum wage and employment. 
Our regression model for earnings, estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), is  
 
 ln  Wageist =  α + β1ln MWst + β2Demographicsi + β3Business Cyclest + β4Ss + β5Tt + εist, (1) 
   10
where i indexes individuals, s indexes states, and t indexes time periods (survey month and year) 
in individual-level data.  The dependent variable, ln Wageist, is the natural log of real hourly 
earnings for individual i, who lives in state s and is surveyed at time t.  Again, only workers who 
are paid hourly are included in the earnings samples.  Because the wage variables are measured 
in logs, the coefficient on the real minimum wage variable, β1, gives the elasticity of average 
hourly earnings with respect to the minimum wage (the percentage change in wages if the 
minimum wage increases by 1 percent). 
  The regressions include several other variables besides the minimum wage.  Variables 
measuring individuals’ age and its square and an indicator variable for females are included to 
control for demographic characteristics that might be related to earnings.  For example, females 
are more likely to work as wait staff, a job that often pays less than the minimum wage because 
of tips.  In some specifications we add controls for state economic conditions (the business 
cycle): the natural log of real personal income per capita, the real contract value of residential 
building permits, the number of initial unemployment claims, and the state unemployment rate in 
that month and year.
15  The regressions include state fixed effects to control for any time-
invariant factors that affect average wages within a state and time fixed effects to control for any 
time factors that are common across states, such as the national business cycle. 
  We pool the data for the various race/ethnicity/nativity groups and interact the minimum 
wage variable with an indicator variable for each group.  We estimate separate regressions for 
teenagers and low-education adults since the coefficients may differ considerably across these 
                                                 
15 The personal income data are deflated using the personal consumption expenditures index.  Both are published 
quarterly by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.  Real personal income is linearly interpolated throughout quarters.  
The population data are data for July of each year from the Bureau of the Census and are linearly interpolated.  The 
initial claims and permits data are from BLS and Census, respectively, and are seasonally adjusted.  The 
unemployment rate data are published monthly by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and are seasonally adjusted.   11
groups.  The standard errors are clustered on group, state, and time period to control for 
heteroscedasticity. 
  Our regression model for employment is similar to the earnings model except that we use 
a probit model because the dependent variable, Workist, is a dichotomous variable which equals 1 
if an individual is employed and 0 otherwise: 
 
 Workist =  Φ(α + β1ln MWst + β2Demographicsi + β3Business Cyclest + β4Ss + β5Tt + εist), (2) 
 
where Φ is the standard cumulative normal distribution.  For ease of interpretation, we report the 
derivatives of the estimated probit coefficients for the minimum wage variable (which is again 
interacted with indicator variables for the various race/ethnicity/nativity groups).  These 
derivatives (changes in probability) are evaluated at the sample means for continuous variables.  
The reported results therefore can be interpreted like results from an OLS regression; they 
indicate the percentage point change in the probability of employment if the minimum wage 
increases by 1 percent.  The employment regressions also include variables measuring age and 
its square and sex; state and survey month/year fixed effects; and (in some specifications) 
business cycle controls.  Observations are clustered on group, state, and survey month/year. 
 
Results 
  The minimum wage has a major effect on earnings among teenagers and, to a lesser 
extent, among low-education adults.  Table 3 shows the results from the earnings regressions, 
with teenagers in columns 1 and 2 and adults in columns 3 and 4.  The even-numbered columns 
include the business cycle controls.  Among teenagers, average hourly earnings increase by   12
about 2.5 percent when the minimum wage increases by 10 percent (column 1).  Controlling for 
state economic conditions slightly reduces the estimated elasticity to about 0.23 (column 2).  The 
estimated elasticities are similar in magnitude for all four race/ethnicity/nativity groups of 
teenagers.
16  The results for low-education adults are more sensitive to controlling for the 
business cycle and differ across groups.  When business cycle controls are included (column 4), 
a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage raises average hourly earnings by about 0.8 percent 
among foreign-born Latinos, 1.4 percent among native-born Latinos, 1.7 percent among non-
Hispanic whites, and 1.1 percent among non-Hispanic blacks. 
  If there is little or no substitution across groups, the earnings results suggest that 
minimum wages will have a more adverse effect on employment among teens than among low-
education adults, and a more adverse effect among non-Hispanic white adults than among blacks 
or Latinos, particularly foreign-born Latinos.  These predictions are only partially borne out in 
the employment results, which are shown in Table 4.  Again, the first two columns report results 
for teenagers and the second two columns for adults, and results in even numbered columns 
include controls for state economic conditions. 
  For both teens and low-education adults, higher minimum wages have the largest adverse 
employment effects among non-Hispanic blacks.  Among teenagers, the estimates indicate that a 
10 percent increase in the minimum wage lowers the probability of employment by about 0.7 
percentage points for foreign-born Latinos, 0.9 percentage points for native-born Latinos, and 1.5 
percentage points for non-Hispanic blacks when controlling for the business cycle (column 2).  
There is no significant disemployment effect among non-Hispanic white teens.  For low-
education adults, higher minimum wages are not significantly adversely associated with 
                                                 
16 Only the estimated elasticity for white teenagers is statistically significantly different from the other groups of 
teenagers (because of the large sample size for whites), but the differences between whites and the other groups are 
small in economic terms.   13
employment among any of the groups examined here, although the coefficient for non-Hispanic 
black adults is negative when controlling for general economic conditions in column 4.  
Controlling for the business cycle, the minimum wage is actually positively associated with 
employment among foreign-born Latinos, with a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage 
boosting the probability of employment by about 1 percentage points (column 4).  The results for 
native-born Latinos and for non-Hispanic whites are also positive but have lower significance 
levels and are smaller in magnitude. 
  Taken together, the results suggest that higher minimum wages boost earnings among 
both teenagers and low-education adults and have adverse employment effects among most 
groups of teenagers.  Our failure to find a negative employment effect among white teenagers 
and among adults appears, at face value, to contradict the predictions of the simple supply and 
demand model presented above.  The model predicts that if minimum wages are positively 
associated with earnings, then minimum wages should be negatively associated with 
employment.  We next investigate two potential reasons for these rather anomalous results: 
substitution across skill groups and sub-minimum wages among undocumented immigrants. 
 
Substitution across skill groups 
  Substitution across workers with different skill levels could help reconcile our results 
with the competitive model.  Employers might replace the least-skilled workers with more 
skilled workers when the minimum wage increases.  If higher minimum wages induce an 
increase in the quantity of labor supplied, as the simple model suggests would happen, then 
employers should be able to choose among workers and hire the more skilled ones.  Our results   14
suggest that employers substitute adult workers—particularly foreign-born Latinos—for teenage 
workers when the minimum wage increases. 
  To further investigate this possibility, we examine the inter-relationship between 
minimum wages and age and education, which are proxies for skill.
17  If firms substitute more 
skilled workers for less skilled workers as the minimum wage increases, workers who are older 
and have more education should face less adverse employment effects than younger and less-
educated workers.  Wages among more-skilled workers also may be less tied to the minimum 
wage than among less-skilled workers, for whom the minimum wage may act as a binding floor.  
We estimated the following basic probit model to examine whether the employment effect of the 
minimum wage differs by age and education: 
 
 Workist =  Φ(α + β1ln MWst + β2ln MWst*Agei + β3ln MWst* No high school +  
  β4Demographicsi + β5Business Cyclest + β6Ss + β7Tt + εist, (3) 
 
where the dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether an individual is employed.  
In the regressions for teenagers, the minimum wage variable is interacted with dummy variables 
for each of the four possible ages (16, 17, 18, and 19).  In the regression for low-education 
adults, the minimum wage is interacted with a linear age variable.  The minimum wage variable 
is also interacted with a dummy variable that equals 1 if an individual has at most 8 years of 
education.  These interactions allow us to examine how the effect of the minimum wage varies 
by age and education, our proxies for skill.  All of these interactions are further interacted with 
                                                 
17 Another way to examine substitution across workers is to look for differences across groups in transitions into and 
out of employment using panel data.  We do not use this approach, which would involve matching individual 
records in the CPS outgoing rotation groups across two consecutive years, because of high mobility rates among 
young adults and immigrants.   15
dummy variables for the four race/ethnicity/nativity groups to allow us to examine how the 
effects differ across groups. 
  The regressions also include demographic controls for age and sex, a dummy variable for 
having at most 8 years of education, controls for the business cycle, and state and month/year 
fixed effects.  As in all regressions here, observations are weighted using the CPS outgoing 
rotation group weights and the standard errors are clustered on race/ethnic group, state, and 
survey date.  We report derivates of the probit coefficients in Table 5 for ease of interpretation.  
The top panel shows results for teens, and the bottom panel for adults who do not have a high 
school diploma. 
  The results suggest skill substitution among teens in response to higher minimum wage.  
Among teenagers, the adverse employment effect of the minimum wage decreases monotonically 
with age for all four groups.  In other words, increases in the minimum wage have larger 
disemployment effects among younger teens, particularly those aged 16, than among older teens.  
The education interaction terms for teens similarly indicate that a higher minimum wage lowers 
employment among teens who have at most an 8
th grade education compared with those who 
have at least some high school (or more) education.  Interestingly, the education result does not 
hold for foreign-born Latino teens (row 5, column 1), who have the lowest average levels of 
education among teenagers. 
  The results for adults also suggest skill substitution.  Among adults who have not 
completed high school, we do not find that the employment effect of the minimum wage differs 
by age.  However, the education interactions indicate that any disemployment effect of higher 
minimum wages is larger (more negative) among adults who have not gone to high school than 
among high school dropouts for native-born Latinos, whites, and blacks.  The employment effect   16
does not differ by education among foreign-born Latinos, however (row 7, column 1).  This 
suggests that education may be less of a signal of skill among Latino immigrants than among 
other groups.  This result is also consistent with the results for foreign-born Latino workers in 
Tables 3 and 4: minimum wages have a smaller positive effect on earnings among foreign-born 
Latino workers than among other low-education adults, and higher minimum wages appear to 
boost employment among foreign-born Latinos.  This occurs despite the fact that foreign-born 
Latinos have considerably less education, on average, than the other workers in our sample.  This 
suggests that, among the pool of low-education workers, immigrants may be the most productive 
workers.  A positive selection process on unobservable characteristics, such as motivation and 
willingness to work hard, may underlie this.  But other factors, such as undocumented status, 
may also play a role.   
 
Legal status and years of U.S. residence 
  Our main results indicate that the positive relationship between the minimum wage and 
average hourly earnings is smaller among adult Latino immigrants than among other workers 
and that higher minimum wages are associated with an increase in employment among adult 
Latino immigrants.  As discussed above, employers may substitute adult Latino immigrants for 
other workers when the minimum wage rises if adult Latino immigrants are perceived as more 
productive than other low-skilled workers.  Another possibility is that many adult Latino 
immigrants are paid less than the legal minimum wage because they are undocumented 
immigrants, causing increases in the minimum wage to have less effect among this group and 
causing employers to substitute toward them when the minimum wage increases.  Indeed, 4.8   17
percent of our sample of adult low-education immigrant hourly workers report earning less than 
the legal minimum, compared with 3.8 percent of other adult low-education hourly workers.
18 
  Theoretically, the effect of minimum wages could be smaller or larger among 
undocumented immigrants than among those who are legally present in the U.S.
19  Employers 
may be more likely to pay undocumented workers less than the legal minimum, particularly if 
they are aware that the workers lack legal status and therefore are unlikely to complain to 
authorities for fear of being deported.  An employer who is already breaking the law in 
knowingly hiring undocumented workers may also disregard minimum wage laws.  If so, then 
undocumented workers are less likely to be affected by changes in minimum wage laws than 
legal immigrants. 
  However, undocumented workers tend to be less skilled than legal immigrants.  They 
have less education, are younger, and have fewer years of U.S. experience, on average (Jasso et 
al. 2004; Passel et al. 2006).  Hence undocumented workers may be more likely to earn low 
wages than legal immigrants and therefore be more affected by changes in minimum wages.  On 
the other hand, despite lower education levels, it could be that illegal immigrants work harder 
under tougher conditions, making them more productive in spite of their low education levels.  
On a theoretical level, it is simply not clear whether undocumented immigrants are more or less 
affected by minimum wage laws than other workers. 
  Undocumented immigrants appear to compose a large and growing fraction of the low-
wage foreign-born labor force.  Estimates suggest that up to one-half of all low-skilled 
immigrant workers—or about 3.1 million people—were undocumented in 2005 (Capps, Fortuny, 
                                                 
18 The literature on immigrant-native differentials in non-compliance with minimum wage laws generally finds no 
significant difference between immigrants and natives in the fraction earning less than the federal minimum wage 
(Cortes, 2004; Fry and Lowell, 1997; Trejo, 1998). 
19 Winegarden and Khor (1991) make a similar argument in modeling the effect of undocumented immigration on 
unemployment rates among U.S.-born youth and minority workers when wages are sticky.   18
and Fix, 2007).  Many of these undocumented workers are Latinos, as Latin American countries 
accounted for at least 80 percent of undocumented immigrants present in the U.S. in 2000 (INS 
2003; Passel, Capps, and Fix 2004). 
  The CPS does not ask directly about visa type or other direct indicators of legal status.  
However, years of U.S. residence, country of origin, and U.S. citizenship—variables that are 
included in the CPS—should be associated with whether an immigrant is undocumented.
20  Most 
undocumented immigrants have been present in the U.S. for less time than legal immigrants, and 
the majority of undocumented immigrants are from Mexico.
21  We therefore investigate whether 
years of U.S. residence, being from Mexico, and being a naturalized U.S. citizen influence the 
impact of minimum wages on earnings and employment among immigrants from Latin America.  
We note that the quality of self-reported variables on immigration status is an issue in this type 
of exercise.  While it seems unlikely that undocumented immigrants would report being 
naturalized U.S. citizens, misreporting of citizenship status is a well-known problem in the 
literature that relies on CPS and decennial Census data (Passel 2007; Passel and Clark 1998).   
Within the sample of Latin American immigrants, we interacted the minimum wage 
variable with a linear variable measuring years of U.S. residence and with dummy variables 
indicating whether an immigrant was from Mexico and whether an immigrant reported being a 
naturalized U.S. citizen.  We estimated the following regression model: 
 
                                                 
20 The CPS reports year of entry in intervals, and we used the midpoint of those intervals to calculate the numbers of 
years of U.S. residence.  Our approach obviously assumes that the CPS includes some undocumented immigrants.  
Bean et al. (1998) and Hanson (2006) both explicitly state that the CPS includes undocumented immigrants.  
Previous studies have used the CPS to examine undocumented immigrants (e.g., Kaushal, 2006; Massey and Bartley 
2005; Passel 2004, 2005a, b; Passel et al. 2004). 
21 In 2004, over half of Mexican immigrants present in the U.S. were undocumented, including at least 80 percent of 
those who entered during the 1990s and early 2000s (Passel 2004, 2005a).  Because of the 1997 the Nicaraguan 
Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA) as well as greater distance from the U.S. border, 
immigrants from other Latin American countries are more likely than Mexicans to be legally present in the U.S.  See 
Kaushal (2006) for a discussion of the effect of NACARA on earnings and employment.   19
  Labor Force Outcomeist =  α + β1ln MWst + β2ln MWst*Years in U.S.i + β3ln MWst*Mexicoi +  
β4ln MWst* naturalized U.S. citizeni + β5Demographicsi +  
  β6Business Cyclest + β7Ss + β8Tt + εist, (4) 
 
where the dependent variable is the natural log of hourly earnings (and the regression is 
estimated using OLS) or a dummy variable that equals 1 if an individual is employed (and a 
probit model is estimated).  The set of demographic controls includes the number of years that an 
individual has lived in the U.S. and the Mexico and naturalized U.S. citizen dummy variables 
(the “main effects”) as well as age, age squared, and sex. 
  If undocumented immigrants tend to have fewer years of U.S. residence and 
undocumented immigrants are less affected by minimum wage laws because employers pay them 
less than the minimum wage, then we expect to find that the impact of the minimum wage on 
earnings and employment grows with years of U.S. residence.  A similar result should hold for 
U.S. citizenship—individuals who report being U.S. citizens should be more affected by 
minimum wage laws if employers violate minimum wage laws when paying undocumented 
immigrants.  If immigrants from Mexico are more likely to be undocumented and undocumented 
workers are paid less than the minimum wage, then the minimum wage should have less of an 
impact on earnings and employment among Mexicans. 
  The results are shown in Table 6.  None of the estimated coefficients (OLS coefficients in 
the earnings regressions and marginal probit coefficients in the employment regressions) are 
significant for teenagers.  This is not surprising since the teenage samples are relatively small 
because most immigrants come as adults.  In the adult low-education sample, both earnings and 
employment increase with years of U.S. residence (row 2) and are lower among naturalized U.S.   20
citizens (row 4).  Any adverse impact of higher minimum wages on employment increases with 
years of U.S. residence, which is consistent with the hypothesis that legal immigrants are more 
affected by minimum wage increases than the undocumented (row 5, column 4).  The positive 
wage effect of higher minimum wages is also larger among naturalized U.S. citizens (row 7, 
column 3).  Any adverse employment effect is larger among immigrants from Mexico, who are 
more likely to be undocumented (row 6, column 4).  In addition, the employment effect of higher 
minimum wages is positive (or less negative) among naturalized U.S. citizens (row 7, column 4). 
  These results provide mixed support for our hypothesis that undocumented immigrants 
are less likely to be affected by changes in the minimum wage, which could account for the 
somewhat anomalous results for Latin American immigrants.  We caution that we are not able to 
identify which immigrants in the CPS data are undocumented and use only crude indicators of 
undocumented status.  Other researchers have noted, for example, that the citizenship variable 
overstates naturalization among recent immigrants—many of whom are likely undocumented 
(Passel 2007).  Correcting the citizenship variable and combining CPS data with better data on 
undocumented immigrants, such as data from the Mexican Migration Project and the Latin 
American Migration Project, might shed more light on non-compliance and the effect of 
minimum wages among undocumented immigrants. 
 
Conclusion 
  This study examined whether the impact of minimum wages differs between foreign- and 
native-born Latinos and their non-Hispanic counterparts in the U.S.  Data from 1994-2005 
indicate that higher minimum wages are associated with an increase in teens’ hourly earnings 
that is similar across race/ethnicity/nativity groups.  However, the disemployment effect is   21
smaller among foreign-born Latino teenagers than among their black and native-born Latino 
counterparts and non-existent among white teens.  This, combined with other results here, 
suggests substitution across skill groups as the minimum wage increases.  Among adults who do 
not have a high school diploma (or equivalent), our results indicate that the wage-boosting effect 
of higher minimum wages is smallest among foreign-born Latinos.  Unlike for the other groups 
examined here, employment among low-education adult Latino immigrants is positively 
associated with the minimum wage.  These results are suggestive of greater incidence of non-
compliance with minimum wage laws among low-education Latino immigrants, many of whom 
are undocumented, but our results are not conclusive.   22
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Figure 1.  A simple model of the expected effects of imposing a minimum wage. 
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Table 1 
Characteristics of Low-Wage Hourly Workers 
 
   
    Workers Paid Hourly Earning:   
  Exactly MW  Below MW  Within 125%  All Workers   
      of MW  Paid Hourly  
Average  age  29.2 30.2 30.9  37.0 
  (14.3) (14.5) (14.7)  (13.4) 
Teen  (aged  16-19)  0.33 0.26 0.27  0.08 
  (0.47) (0.44) (0.45)  (0.28) 
Young adult (aged 20-24)  0.21  0.24  0.22  0.14 
  (0.41) (0.43) (0.41)  (0.35) 
Latino  0.26 0.16 0.20  0.14 
  (0.44) (0.37) (0.40)  (0.35) 
Native-born  Latino  0.09 0.06 0.08  0.06 
  (0.29) (0.24) (0.27)  (0.24) 
Foreign-born  Latino  0.17 0.10 0.12  0.08 
  (0.38) (0.30) (0.32)  (0.26) 
White  (non-Hispanic)  0.56 0.68 0.61  0.69 
  (0.50) (0.47) (0.49)  (0.46) 
Black  (non-Hispanic)  0.13 0.11 0.14  0.13 
  (0.33) (0.31) (0.35)  (0.34) 
Female  0.59 0.64 0.59  0.50 
  (0.49) (0.48) (0.49)  (0.50) 
Less than high school  0.46  0.35  0.38  0.18 
  graduate  (0.50) (0.48) (0.48)  (0.38) 
Sample size  26,144  39,944  144,018  1,228,380   
 
Note: Shown are means (standard deviations) based on individual-level data from the CPS-ORG during 
the period 1994-2005 for workers who report being paid hourly, weighted using the outgoing rotation 
weights.  Workers who earn less than $1 per hour or more than $100 per hour are not included.  Latinos 
are all individuals who identify themselves as Hispanic.  Native-born Latinos is Hispanics born in the 
U.S. or outlying areas, and foreign-born Latinos is Hispanics born outside of the U.S. and outlying areas. 
   30
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for Samples of Teenagers and Low-Education Adults 
 
   
 Teenagers  Adults     
Real hourly earnings  7.18  9.96 
 (conditional  on  employment) (2.67)  (4.69) 
Employed 0.43  0.61 
 (0.49)  (0.49) 
Average age  17.5  36.0 
 (1.1)  (10.0) 
Foreign-born Latino  0.05  0.33 
 (0.21)  (0.47) 
Native-born Latino  0.11  0.09 
 (0.31)  (0.29) 
White (non-Hispanic)  0.69  0.43 
 (0.46)  (0.50) 
Black (non-Hispanic)  0.15  0.15 
 (0.36)  (0.35) 
Female 0.49  0.47 
 (0.50)  (0.50) 
Sample size, all  238,183  228,194   
Sample size, hourly workers  95,592  102,479   
 
Note: Shown are means (standard deviations) based on weighted individual-level data from the CPS-ORG 
during the period 1994-2005.  Low-education adults do not have a high school diploma and are aged 20-
54.  The sample for average hourly earnings only includes workers who report being paid hourly and earn 
at least $1 per hour and no more than $100 per hour.  Earnings are deflated using the CPI-W (January 
2005 = 100).  Latinos are individuals who identify themselves as Hispanic.  Native-born Latinos is only 
Hispanics born in the U.S. (not outlying areas), and foreign-born Latinos is Hispanics born in Latin 
America, Cuba, or the Dominican Republic.   31
Table 3 
Effect of the Minimum Wage on Average Hourly Earnings 
 
   
   Teens     Low-Education  Adults   
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)   
Foreign-born  Latino  0.250** 0.233**  0.123** 0.083** 
  (0.022) (0.024)  (0.028) (0.032) 
 
Native-born  Latino  0.250** 0.233**  0.179** 0.139** 
  (0.022) (0.024)  (0.028) (0.032) 
 
White  (non-Hispanic)  0.255** 0.238**  0.210** 0.170** 
  (0.022) (0.024)  (0.028) (0.032) 
 
Black  (non-Hispanic)  0.248** 0.231**  0.147** 0.107** 
  (0.022) (0.024)  (0.028) (0.032) 
 
Business cycle controls  No  Yes  No  Yes   
 
† p<.1; * p<.05; ** p<.01 
Note: Shown are estimated coefficients on the natural log of the real minimum wage from OLS 
regressions.  The dependent variable is the natural log of the real hourly earnings.  All regressions include 
age, age
2, sex, state and survey month/year fixed effects; some specifications add business cycle controls 
(the natural log of real personal income per capita, the real contract value of residential building permits, 
the number of initial unemployment claims, and the unemployment rate).  Less-educated adults are aged 
20-54 and do not have a high school diploma; teens are aged 16-19.  Robust, clustered standard errors are 
in parentheses.  Observations are weighted using the outgoing rotation weights.   32
Table 4 
Effect of the Minimum Wage on Employment 
 
   
   Teens     Low-Education  Adults   
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)   
Foreign-born Latino  -0.021  -0.070*  0.164**  0.096** 
  (0.027) (0.028)  (0.024) (0.029) 
 
Native-born Latino  -0.042  -0.092**  0.110**  0.042 
  (0.026) (0.028)  (0.024) (0.029) 
 
White  (non-Hispanic) 0.033  -0.016 0.116**  0.048
† 
  (0.026) (0.028)  (0.024) (0.029) 
 
Black (non-Hispanic)  -0.101**  -0.150**  0.037  -0.031 
  (0.026) (0.028)  (0.024) (0.029) 
 
Business cycle controls  No  Yes  No  Yes   
 
† p<.1; * p<.05; ** p<.01 
Note: Shown are estimated derivatives of coefficients on the natural log of the real minimum wage from 
probit regressions.  The dependent variable equals 1 if an individual is employed and 0 otherwise.  All 
regressions include age, age
2, sex, state and survey month/year fixed effects; some specifications add 
business cycle controls (the natural log of real personal income per capita, the real contract value of 
residential building permits, the number of initial unemployment claims, and the unemployment rate).  
Less-educated adults are aged 20-54 and do not have a high school diploma; teens are aged 16-19.  
Robust, clustered standard errors are in parentheses.  Observations are weighted using the outgoing 
rotation weights.   33
Table 5 
Effects of the Minimum Wage on Employment by Age and Education 
 
   
 Foreign-born  Native-born  White  Black 
 Latino  Latino  (non-Hispanic)  (non-Hispanic) 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)   
Teens: 
Minimum wage * age 16  -0.170*  -0.109*  -0.136**  -0.102
† 
 (0.077)  (0.055)  (0.038)  (0.060) 
 
Minimum wage * age 17  -0.094  -0.058  -0.087*  -0.071 
 (0.076)  (0.055)  (0.036)  (0.058) 
 
Minimum wage * age 18  0.033  0.051  -0.019  0.009 
 (0.074)  (0.055)  (0.038)  (0.059) 
 
Minimum wage * age 19  0.077  0.111
† 0.016 0.050 
 (0.074)  (0.057)  (0.040)  (0.060) 
 
Minimum wage * no high school -0.066  -0.211*  -0.265**  -0.277** 
 (0.093)  (0.067)  (0.093)  (0.094)   
 
Low-Education Adults: 
Minimum wage * age  0.0002  0.0005  -0.0006  0.0027 
 (0.0014)  (0.0014)  (0.0014)  (0.0014) 
 
Minimum wage * no high school -0.050  -0.083*  -0.129**  -0.163** 
 (0.033)  (0.034)  (0.033)  (0.034)   
 
† p<.1; * p<.05; ** p<.01 
Note: Shown are estimated derivatives of coefficients on the natural log of the real minimum wage from 
probit regressions; the dependent variable equals 1 if an individual is employed and 0 otherwise.  All 
regressions include age and age
2 (dummy variables for age 16, age 17, and age 18 in the teenage 
regressions), sex, a dummy variable for no high school (8 years of education or less), state and survey 
month/year fixed effects, and business cycle controls.  Separate regressions were estimated for teens and 
low-education adults.  Less-educated adults are aged 20-54 and do not have a high school diploma; teens 
are aged 16-19.  Robust, clustered standard errors are in parentheses.  Observations are weighted using 
the outgoing rotation weights.  34
Table 6 
Effect of the Minimum Wage among Latin American Immigrants 
 
   
   Teens     Low-Education  Adults   
  Earnings Employment  Earnings Employment   
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)   
Minimum wage  0.208  -0.124  0.123
† 0.128
† 
  (0.180) (0.195)  (0.069) (0.068) 
 
Years of U.S. residence  -0.025  -0.009  0.012**  0.009* 
  (0.019) (0.021)  (0.005) (0.004) 
 
From  Mexico  0.291 0.223  -0.100 0.287** 
  (0.272) (0.249)  (0.087) (0.105) 
 
Naturalized U.S. citizen  0.168  -0.266  -0.336**  -0.422** 
  (0.404) (0.255)  (0.111) (0.116) 
 
Minimum wage * years of U.S.  0.015  0.001  -0.003  -0.005* 
residence  (0.019) (0.012)  (0.003) (0.002) 
 
Minimum wage * from Mexico  -0.166  -0.067  0.041  -0.177** 
  (0.156) (0.165)  (0.050) (0.053) 
 
Minimum wage * naturalized  -0.071  0.209  0.231**  0.242** 
U.S.  citizen  (0.226) (0.248)  (0.063) (0.061)  
 
† p<.1; * p<.05; ** p<.01 
Note: The sample includes only immigrants from Latin America, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic.  
Columns 1 and 3 show estimated coefficients on the natural log of the real minimum wage from OLS 
regressions; the dependent variable is the natural log of the real hourly earnings.  Columns 2 and 4 show 
estimated derivatives of coefficients on the natural log of the real minimum wage from probit regressions; 
the dependent variable equals 1 if an individual is employed and 0 otherwise.  All regressions include age, 
age
2, sex, U.S. citizenship status, state and survey month/year fixed effects, and business cycle controls.  
Less-educated adults are aged 20-54 and do not have a high school diploma; teens are aged 16-19.  






Appendix Table 1 
States that Exceeded the Federal Minimum Wage 
 
   
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005   
Alaska  X X X X X X X X X X X X 
California        X X X X X X X X X 
Connecticut  X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Delaware      X X    X X X X X X X 
D.C.  X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Hawaii  X X X X X X X X X X X X 
I l l i n o i s              X   X  
Iowa  X  X  X           
Maine           X  X  X  X 
Massachusetts     X X X X X X X X X X 
M i n n e s o t a               X  
New  Jersey  X  X  X  X          X 
N e w   Y o r k               X  
Oregon  X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Rhode  Island  X X X X    X X X X X X X 
Vermont    X X X X X X X X X X X 
Washington  X X X X X X X X X X X X 
W i s c o n s i n               X    
 
Note to Appendix Table 1: The federal minimum wage rose from $4.25 an hour to $4.75 an hour in October 1996 and to $5.15 an hour in September 1997.  
Shown are states that exceeded the federal minimum wage at any time during the year(s) indicated. 
 